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principles
thority.

"is

a rational

of moral rectitude

science,founded ipon universal
but modified by habit and

"---Lord Mansfield.

"Let us consider wherein the law consists
find it
in

au-

to be,not

in

and vwe shall

particular instances and precedent,but

the reason of the law."---Lord Holt.

Introduction.

Vaxims have always been considored a necessary part
has been said byr some writers that

law.

It

same

force as acts of Parliamentwhen

dicial

sanction.

In

order to receive

of the

they are of the

they have received juthis

judicial

sanction

it would seem that the maxim should pass through a certain
probationary stage of formation,as it were,and have proved its
merit

and value.
T'axims abounded in

the cor.ron law,but on account

of

statutory modifications,changes in the mode of procedure and
a multiplication of the reported decisions,many
have passed into disuse. Among those
is this one under discussion:

of the maxims

that are still intact

In jure non remota causa,sed

proxima,spectatur. It is the first of Lord Bacon's "IMaxims of
Law"
The origin of the maxim is
can be found in

the

some of the maxims
probably this

is

K
in

ca.
ivil

uncertain.
law.

No trace of it

Bacon intimates that

his work are orig-inal with him,and very

one of them.

It

has been suggested by some

authorities that Bacon drew the text of it from certain philosophical

discussions which

v re in

the hands of nearly all

thinking people

at that

time.

This is

doubtless

the true

source from which the maxim was drawn.
When Bacon wrote the maxim several methods of investigating

truth

were used by

philyosophers,and

it

was Bacons

purpose to prove that these methods were erroneous.
ed that

the true method was by a

search

for

He declar-

causes;that no

one questioned. He went still further and taught that the
proximate

cause was to be searched out,and the remote

causes

to be neglected. This mode of searching for truth has become
firmly established in legal jurisprudence.
The meaning of the maxim is explained by Bacon in the
following manner,he

said "It

were

infinite

for the law to

consider the cause of causes,and the impulse one from another,
therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause;and
judgeth of acts by that without looking to any other decree."
The maxim was first employed by the courts as an autho--,
tive rule in cases of insurance.
ed, a: d now it is used in
are parties,and

in

Gradually its use has increas-

certain cases where

actions for negligence

common carriers

and :-reach of con-

tract,when it is sought to determine the defendants liability
for damages. On account of the different business
relations

which exist between

the plaintiff

and social

and defendant

in

these different classes of cases,the line of reasoning which

3.
should be

persued in

attempting to determine the proximate

cause in a case which falls in any one of these

divisions,

should be different than that used in either of the other two.
It is the purpose of this discussion to illustrate and set
forth as clearly as possible the meaning and application of
the maxim in these various branches of the law.

Application of the maxim.
A.

Insurance is

the law of

Insurance.

"a contract whereby for a stipulated considera-

tion,one party undertahes
tain risks."

In

to indemnify the other against cer-

Philips on Ins.§ 1.
When the contract is

made the basis of a s'-)it

to recover for loss sustainedit must be shown that the loss
was the proximate cause of the peril insured againsti In Waters v.Ins.Co. 11 Peters 213,the court said 'We must interpret
this instrument according to the known principles of the common law.It was a well established principle of that law that
in all cases of loss we are to attribute it to the proximate
cause and not to any remote cause.

"

Before proceeding further let us examine the
nature of the contract. It is a contract of indemnify made
in the interest of trade,and covering large amounts of property. In interpreting it the words used,the intent of the
parties,and the public bearing of the questions are to be
taken into consideration.

The courts should give the policy

a liberal construction. Robertson v.French,4 East,]35.
The policy is the evidence of the intention
of the parties. It names the perils insured against and the

5.

terms upon which the risks are assumed.

If

the partiei

agree

that loss from certain perils are exceptedthe policy so s
states. From this it is evident that the intention of the
parties as expressed il the policy and blended with public
welfare, ought to be the ground upon which the courts should
base their argument when deciding whether or not the loss sued
for was caused proximately by peril insured against.
In some few instances the courts haveunfortunately,fallen into the error of reasoning metp~hysically,
utterly disregarding the intent of the parties. Although the
logic used in deciding may have been faultless,yet the decisions rendered have worked hardship because the intent of the
p.arties was not included in the premises.
In

the case of Ins.Co.v.

Sherwood,14 How.361,

the court said "It should not be forgotten,that ....

the sci-

ence of insurance law has been made and kept a practical system by avoiding
it

subtile and refined reasbning,however logical

may seem to be,and looking for

safe and practical

rules."

When a loss is occasioned by a peril mentioned
in the policy,but

such peril being immediately connected or

caused by a peril not
cluded from the

policythe

mentioned,or one bY expressterms
question of proximate

cause

exoften

becomes a very difficult one. As has already been shown there

6.
-'ie certain principles which the court ought to take notice
of in arriving at a decision. One of the early cases, De Vaux
v. Salvador,4 Ad.&

R.1.420,illust'ates the error into which

some of the courts have fallen.
In

that case it

appears that the master of

the Salvador had insured her against rerils

of the sea.

'1hile

pursuing her voyoge she collided with a steamship ,,iithout

neg-

lige'ce on the part of either. The conflicting claims of damages were laid before an arbitrator at Calcutta.The arbitrator decidedthat
'was

in

in

accordance with the law of nations which

force at that place,each should pay half of the joint

loss. The master of the Salvador brought suit against the
underwriters for the sum he was obliged to pay,claiming that
the collision,a peril of the sea,was the proximate cause of
the loss. The court held,however,that the law of Calcutta Wa.s
the proximate cause. Reasoning that theie had intervened between the collision and the loss for :ihich suit was brought,
an efficient anu independent causeto wit:

the law of Calcutta,

and that therefore the collision was the remote cause.
This case has been expressly overruled and the
reasoning disapproved of,by the case of Peters v.Warehouse Ins.
Co.14 Peters,99. The facts vere similar to those of the case
just mentioned.

The plaintiff

insured the s'ip Paragon against

7.
perils of the sea. In sailing down the Elbe she collided with
d,, galliot,

and the latter was sunk. The master of the galliot

libeled the Paragon,while the latter was lying at Hamburg. It
was decreedthat according to the law of Hamburg,the collision being without the fault

of either,each should pay half

of

the joint loss. The maste- of the Paragon brought suit against
the underwriters for the sum paid. The defendant argued that
the law of Hamburg was the proximate cause,citing De Vaux v.
Salvador. Story J.in the opinion said,"This is an over refinement and savors more of physical than legal reasoning........
The law,as a practical

science,does not indulge in any such

niceties. It seeks to administer justice according to a fair
interpretation of the parties;and deems that loss to be within
the rolicy which is a natural and necessary consequence of the
peril insured against. In a just view of the matter,the collision was the

sole proximate

cause of the loss,and the de-

cree of the court did but ascertain and fix the amount of
charges upon the Paragon,anO
moment of the

attached thereto at the very

collision. The maxim causa non remota spectatur,

is not without limitation,and has never been applied in the
matter of insurance to the extent contended for,but that it
has been constantly qualified and constantly applied in modified practical

sense,to the peril

insured against."

8.
In Potter v.Ins.Co.3 Sumner,27. Story J. remarked that

"In

cases of this sort it

will not do to refine 'o

much upon metphysical sublities. If a vessel is insured against
peril only,and is burned to the waters edge and fills writh
water and sinksit would be difficult in common sense to attribute the loss to any other proximate cause than the fire,
and yet the water was the proximate cause of the submersion.
If a vessel is insured against barratry of the master and
crew and they fraudulently bore holes in the bottom and thereb:

she sinks,in one sense she sinks from filling in of water,

but in a just sense the proximate cause is the barratorious
boring of holes in the bottom."
In

the case of the Ins. Co.v.Transp. Co.12 Wall.

194,it appeared that the plaintiffs had insured their vessel
against loss by fire.

On her voyage a collision occurred,and

as a consequence a fire :ias started :thich caused the vessel to
sink. The court held that the fire was the proximate cause of
the loss. It was remarked by the judge writing the opinion,
that "Before any policy was issued,the transporters were the
insurers against collision and 1"ire,no matter how caused.
They sought protection against some of the probable consequences of those risks,anu they obtained a policy insuring
them against all losses by fire,except fire cause. by certain

9.
things of which fire by collision was not one. Against every
other consequence of a collision than fire,they remained their
own insurers,but the ris" by fire was no longer theirs."
In

Butler v.Wildman,3 B.& A.3YD.

The facts

were substantially these; the owner of a vessel insured her
against

loss by the enemy. On being attacked by the enemy,

the captain threw overboard a large

iiuanity of

Spanish dol-

lars to prevent

their falling into the h-ands of the enemy.

Bailey J.

"It

said,

was the duty of the master to prevent any-

thing which could strengthen the hands of the enemy from falling into their possession.

Now as the money wo.Lld strengthen

the enemy,it was the duty of the master to throw it
....

overboard.

I think the enemy was the proximate cause of the loss."
In P agoun v. Ins. Co.l Story,157,the court said,

"All the consequences naturally flowing from the peril

insured

against,or incident thereto,are properly attributable to the
peril itself.

If

there is

a capture,and before the vessel

delivered from that peril,she is

is

afterw.vards lost by fire,or

accident or negligence of the captors, I think it is clear
that the whole loss is

properly attributable to the capture.
a
It would be an over refinement and metphysical sublity to

holL otherwise,and would shake the confidence of thn
cial world in

commer-

the supposed indemnity held out by policies

10.
against

common perils."

the

See

Levie v.Janson

14 East

648.

Price v. H1omer

12 Mass.230.

Brown v. Ins. Co.

11 Johns.14.

The correct line of reasoning and in applying
the maxim is illustrated by cases where the property insured
is placed in such a position by negligence or barratry of the
master or crew,that it is acted upon by the peril

insured

against. In those cases the peril insurecd against is the proximate cause of the loss, unless injury caused by negligence or
oarratry of the master or crew is
terms of the policy.

In

the latter

rat-y of the master or crew is

excluLed by the

expressly

case,the negligence
the proximate

or bar-

cause of the

entire loss;otherwise no force would be given to the exception.
Ins.Co.v.Laurence

10 Peters 507.

Waters v.Ins.Co.

11 Peters 213.

In

the opinion of the last

case

Story J.

cited

remarked, "If we look at the question upon mere principle
without reference

to any authority,it

is

difficalt

to escape

from the conclusion,that a loss by a peril insurea against,
and occasioned by negligence is a loss within a marine policy
unless there be some other language in it ,hich repels that
conclusion. "

II.
The same genc- i principles which should govern the application of the maxim in marine insurance,should
be observed in

fi-e insurance.

cases will

A few illustrative

be sufficient to show the use of the maxim in
When a fire occurs it

is

that branch.

usually surrouided

by various elements,such as thievsbreakage in
to places of safety,exrlosionetc.

removin,

gooc~s

Which aid in causing loss.

Whether or not a claim for loss occasioned by any of these can
be sustained against the insurance company,depenus
struction the courts put upon the policy.

If

it

should appear

that the parties intended the policy to cover all
the fire is

such losses,

considered the proximate cause,and these elements

as simply incidents.
that it

upon con-

But if,on the other hand,the courts find

was the intention of the parties to exclude damages

by these intervening causes,then the fire is the remote cause
of any damage that the excepted causes may have occasioned.
In
pany

.Thite v. Ins. Co.57 Me.91,the insurance

com-

ras held liable for goods stolen during the progress of

the fire.

In

Ins.Co.v. Corlis 21 Wend.376,for loss caused by

the proper authorities blowing up a building to prevent fire;
and for man: other losses traceable directly to an accidental
fire,as injury from cinders or smoke.
See

Greenwald v. Ins. Co.

G

Q.:3.N.C.319.

3 Phila.323.

12.

in case of removal of goods or destruction of
property to prevent further progress of the fire,there must
have been an apparent necessity for such action. The necessity need not be actual,but the acts should be such as an ordinarily prudent man wo'uTdd have authorized in
surrounding

circumstances,

necessity was apparent,the
mate cause.

If

remote cause.

White v.Ins. Co.57 ie.91.
courts hold the fire

there was no such necessity the
The

view of all
If

the

such

;vas the proxifire

courts reason something like this;

:ias the
if there

was no real or apparent nece3sity for the action taken in a
common sense view of the matter a

new cause has intervened

between the fire and the lossviz:the unwarranted action of
the person whose property is insured. But if the assured,or
person in authority had reasonable grounds fo '

the belief

that such action was necessary to save the property on account
of the proximity of the firelooking
practical

point of view,the fire

the insurer is

at the matter from a
is

the proximate

cause and

liable.
In the case of Everetts v.Ins.Co.19 C.B.120,

The facts were substantially as follows;a large powder magazine situated in London exploded. The concussion caused great
destruction to buildings situated in the neighborhood.Among
those injured

ras one owned by the plaintiff.The clause in

13.
his policy wias that
loss

the insurer

as was occasioned by fire."

meaning of the parties

"would only make good such
Earl

under the

C.J.

contract?"

said,

"What was

the

He came to the

conclusion

that the loss was not within the meaning of the

policy.

substance he stated that to hold otherwise,injury

In

occasioned to a
attributed

building by an earthquake,which

to a subterranean fireor

was usually

the shattering of window-

glass by the firing of artillery at a review,vwould be damage
by fire.

Miller J.

remarked,

"In

these insurance

c,ses we are

bound to look to the immediate cause. In this instance it cannot be siad that the loss was occasioned by fire,it was occasioned by a concussion

caused by fire,and

we must therefore

go to the cause of causes before we arrive at the origin of
the loss,but this was not was intended by the parties."
The danger of arriving at a conclusion by
philosophical reasoning and then holding as a logical sequence
that such conclusion wias the intention of the parties,without
discussing the facts with regard to such intention,is illustrated by the case of Ins. Co.v.Tweed,7 Wall.44. The facts in
that case were these;

an explosion occurred in a warehouse

situated directly across the street from one owned by the
plaintiff.A fire ensued which was communicated to the plaintiffs warehouse which was burned.The policy of the plaintiff

14.
excluded loss by explosion. The plaintiff brought

suit on the

policy.Viller J.said, "The question is to ascertain whether
any new cause has intervened between the fact accomplished
and the alleged cause.If

a new force 0:- power has intervened,

sifficient to stand the cause of the misfortunethe other
must be considered the remote. In the present case we think
there is no

such new oause. The explosion undoubtedly produc-

ed and set in motion the fire which burned the plaintiffs
property. The fact that it was first

carried to the warehouse

by burning another building supplies no new cause or force
which caused the burning. " He then said that this was in :<ccordance with the intention of the parties. Possibly it was
but I do not think that the learned justices line of reasoning to reac. such conclusion is entirely free from criticism.
It does not seem to me to be a logical statement to say,that
be cause in a physical sense the explosion was the approximate cause,therefore it was the proximate cause within the
91&M to

intention of the parties. There would be no ground for the
learned justices assuming, as he must have, that the parties
intended to have the contract interpreted from a physical
standpoint. It might have been that the parties only intended
to exclude loss by an explosion

in

the building;or

tlat

they

only intended to exclude loss caused by concussion,and yet

15.
include loss if
plosion.

ignqition followed in

The line

conasequence

of such ex-

of reasoning used by the learned justice

will not admit the discussing of these

questions.It mig t

easily have been that the burning of an intervening
vrould have been

builiding

considered a new cause within the intent

of

the parties.In my opinion he ought to have first to have decided,that

it was the plain intention of the parties a3 ex-

pressed in

the policy,to

sion if

exclude

no new physical

call into

cause

all

los-s caused by an explo-

intervened. This,of course,viould

discussion the reneral

intention of parties in in-

troducing such clauses.A decision arrived at by this method
would be much more likely to -ive voice to the true intention
of the parties,than

the one used.
From this

examination of the

cases,it

becomes

fully apparent that the application of the maxim in this
branch of the law ought to be a natural

and practical

one.As

was said by one of the judges,the maxim has been limited and
moulded by the courts so that expression ray be given to the
intention of the parties. As a rule persons making these contracts

do not take

into consideration

refined and subtile rea-

soning, and therefore the ) esS metaphiysical

and the more prac-

tical the reasoning,the greater the justice that ,fill be rendered to all

persons

concerned.

18.
B.In the law of common

carriers.

We will now discuss the maxim as applied to the law of
common carriers.
A common carrier may be defined as one who,by
virtue of his calling,holus himself out to the public as a
transporter of goods for hire,for

all

those who

choose to em-

.1

?YOf.

ploy him.

L*

L

t3Vt&LC.k('

By comnon law he is
placed in
is

L

6-v
.-

an insurer of all

his possession for transportation.

founded upon public policy.

It

ltIl .S
goods

This liability

was contrived by the policy

of the law for the safety of all persons who,by the nature of
their affairs,were obliged to trust him. Coggs v.Bernard,2
Ld.Ray. 909.
The
loss from all

causes.

carrier is not,however,an insurer against
If

was occasioned by the

he can show that the loss or injury
act of God,the public

enemy,act of the

shipper or defect of the article itself ;he will be relieved
from responsibility. In
prevail he must
remote

order to have the first two defences

show that they were the proximate

cause of the loss.
New Brunswick v.Tiers

24

Merchant v.N.Y.C.R.R.Co.

30 !T.Y.

.J.L.

697.
5607.

and not

the

17.
As has already been said the
bility

is

common

founded upon public policy.With

carriers

this

fact

it is a natural and logical proposition, that

in

liaview

is from the

standpoint of public welfare that the courts should view the
facts,when callec

upon to determine whether ot not any of the

exceptions memtioned were the proximate

cause of the loss.

Some of the courts,for some reason,have disregarded this underlying principle and have reasoned from other points of
view when applying the maxim. As a consequence their decisions
h ave occasioned much confusion in
A line of cases in

this

branch.

Pennsylvania

and in

MIass-

achusetts holding one way on a certain question,reasoning
from standpoints other than that of public policy;and the New
York Court of Appeals

and the United States

supreme

court hold-

ing directly opposite, founding their decisions on the general
welfare of the public, illustrates
method of reasoning. The

the erroneous

and correct

question involved in each case was

substantially,,whether in a case where goods having been rlaced in the possession of a common carrier for transportation,
and by his negligence placed in such a position that they
were

destroyed or damaged by act of God,the

negligence should be considered the proximate
loss.

act of God or th,'
cause of the

18.
The question first arose in the case of MorIn that case it

rison v.Davis & Co.20 Pa.St.171.
that

the defendants

was

recked at

canal

if

the canal

b., an extrordin-

had not negligently

the defendant

out with a lame horse

goods,

boat containing the plaintiffs

a certain point in

iary flood;that

was shown

started

the boat would have passed the point in

safety before the flood occurred. The defendant argued,and
the court held that the act of God Jas the proximate cause of
the loss. The erroneous ground taken by the court will be
1-.own by quoting a single
are answierable

carrier)
sequences

sentence.

The

court

said,

con-

for tho ordiniary and proximate

negligence,and not for those that

of their

(the

"They

are re-

mote and extrordiniary. " The court here uses reasoning that is
proper

in

cases

involving the negligence of an ordiniary per-

son and not that of a common carrier.
The

M'assachsuetts

courts followed this

decis-

ion shortly afterwards in the case of Denny v.N.Y.C.R.R.Co.
13 Gray,481. In this case the defendant received plaintiffs
goods at Suspension Bridge to transport to Boston. The goods
were delayed at some place between Syracuse and Suspension
Bridge through the negligence

of the defendant.

bany they were damaged by an extrordiniary
said,

"The rise

of the water in

While in

flood.

Al-

Ilerrick J.

the Hudson which did the mis-

19.
chiefoccurred

at a

subsequent period and conse uently was the

dir-ect and proximate cause to which mischief is to be attributed. The negligence of the defendant was the remote; it had
ceased to operate as an activeefficient and prevailing cause
as

soon as the wool had been carried beyond Syracuse,and can-

not therefore

for any injury

subjoct them to responsibility

to the plaintiffs

property resulting

vening accident,which

from a subsequent

'Jas the proximate

inter-

cause by which it

was

produced. It is the latter only to which the loss sustained
by him is attributable.See Hoadley v.Transp.Coo 115 Mass.304.
Here again we

find that the court says noth-

ing as to what application of the maxim public policy would
dictate.

In

the eye of a philosopher perhaps a new cause had

intervened between the negligence of the carrierbut had any
new cause intervened in the eye of rublic policy?
The New York courts and the United States supreme court have not followed these cases,but have rendered
decisions directly opposite~founding their reasoning on the
true basis public policy.

They hold that in

such cases the

negligence of the carrier is the proximate cause and the carrier is

therefore liable.
In

New York this

of Reed v.Spaulding,30

N.Y.330.

rule was adopted by' the
Davy J.said,

"If

case

the goods

therefore had been forwarded from Mew York to Albany with

20.
reasonable diligence,and the injury had happened to them as
it did,by an act of Godthen the defendant would have been
excused and exempted from liability for the damage of the
goods so entrusted to iim.....The policy of the law is to hold
carriers to a strict liability and this policy for a wise and
just purpose ougrt not to be departed from....This principle..
is founded alike on good sense and good moral3."
The United States supreme

court has apparentlI

followed the New York doctrine in the case of R.R.Co.v.Reeves,
10

Wall.173. This case has sometimes~as following the Pennsyl-

vania and Massachsuetts casesbut upon carefV2 examination it
o'Lld seemat leatas if there was nothing in the decision
rendered that is opposed to the New York rule. Goods belongin7, to the defendant in error were left in such a position by
the plaintiff in error,that they were destroyed by an extrordiniary flood. The court held that the proper charge to the
jury was the one requested by the plaintiff in error,viz.
"Where the damages shown to have resulted from the immediate
act of Godsuch as sudden and extrordiniary flood,the carrier
waould be exempted from liability unless the plaintiff should
prove that the defendant ras guilty of some negligence in not

providing for the safety of the goods.That it

could so do

must be shown by the plaintiff or must appear in the facts of

21.
the case."

The meaning of this

charge

by a remark made by the judge in

is

made somewhat

clearer

the case of Halliday v.Ken-

ard.
Ile said,

"We

do not mean to be understood as

laying down a different rule than the one which was laid

dow-n

by this court in the late case of R.R.Co.v.Reeves namely,that
ordiniary diligence is all that is

reqUired of the carrier to

avoid or remedy the effect of am overpowering cause."
The rule adopted by the New York courtsand
indicated by the United States Supreme Court is undoubtedly
the best. If the carrier wishes to excuse himself for any injury to goods placed in his possession for transportation,
caused by an

"overpowering cause",he must handle the goods

with ordiniary diligence. The rule works equitably and justly
with both parties,ana keeps the carrier from being negligent.,
Enough has been
question of proximate
of comon carriers,the

cause arises

in

connection with the law

maxim ought to be applied with an in-

tent to render a decision
to public welfare, If

said to show that when the

.hich will

be the most beneficial

the courts of Pennsylvamia anda Massach-

suetts had reasoned from the standpoint of public policy and
then arrived at the conclusion that the welfare of the public
would be in

no way injured by holding that the negligence was

22.
the remote cause,their decisions would not be open to

such

severe crtticism as they are.
It is clear that unless the development of the
law of comr~on carriers
policy,it will become
-As a consequence
inj ured.

is

founded upon the basis of public

a confused, conflicting and uncertain.

the welfare of the public will be greatly

23.

C. In actions for negligence and breach of contract.

In a general way the application of
the maxim in these two classes of cases is the same.In either
case the defendant is only liable for the natural and probable
consequences of his acts. In law the defendants acts are considered the proximate cause of such natural and probable reSul t S.
As the reasoning used in applying the maxim
in a.r&tisb.$ fo

breach of contract is

so similar to that used in

actions ±or negligence,it will only be necessary to discuss
the latter.
When a suit for damages causeu by negligence
comes before the courts,they examine the facts for the purpose of ascertaining whether there exists between the aamage
complained of and the acts of the defendant a certain cansual
relation,to wit;that the damage was the natural and probable
consequence of the wrongful

act. If there exists such a rela-

tion between the two,then the negligence is the proximate
cause of such loss and the defendant is liable.
In the case of Gerdhart v.Bates, ' Ell.&.B1.490.
Lord Campbell states the matter in this viay,he said "If the
wrong and the legal damage are not known to common experience
to be a usual sequenceand the damage does not according to

24.
the ordiniary

course of even-ts ,follow

and the damage are not
as cause and effect
substantially
436.

laid

sufficiently

from the wrong,the wrong
con-joined or connected

to support an action."
down by Agnew J.in

The same rule was

I'cGraw v.Stone,53 Pa.St.

are not" he said "to link together as cause and ef-

"Tie

fect,events having no probable
which could not by prudent

connection in

the mind,

and

circumspection and ordiniary

thoughtfulness be foreseen as likely to happen in consequence
in

of the act

which

ve are

engagel.

"

Yet it may be that the injury would not have
occurred had it
But it

not been for the negligence of the defendant.

would be manifestly unjust for a person to be

to make good all
stances result
courts have

compelled

possible loss that might under any circumfrom his act,no matter how far removed.

The

decided that there must be the connection between

the two. already described. If there is
the defendant

are the remote

not then

the acts of

cause and therefore he is not

liable.
Let us not get an erroneous
that must exist between

ual relation
essary that

the

specific

the two.

It

is

not nec-

injury should have been actuall

order to have the negligence

seen in

idea of the act-

cause.

It

need only be such as might

pated.

Higgins v.Dewey,107 Mass.494.

considered

fore-

the proximate

easily have been antici-

2u5.
Pollock C.R.
person who

in

Rigby

Uoes a wrong is

at leat

v.iiowit,remarked
responsible

that"Every

for all

the

mischievous consequences that may have been reasonably anticipated to result

under orainiary circumstances

from such mis-

conduct. u
The term,reasonably to be expected,means such
consequences

as would naturally

to follow in

the long run.

Moulton v.Sanford,51
In

and ordiniarily

be expected

Smith v.Telegraph Co.

83 I.Y.ll5

1'e.134,Sutton v.Wauwatosa,29

Grounlund v. Chapin,5 Ex.248,

Wis.21.

Pollock J.

said "I entertain considerable doubt whether a person who has
been guilty of negligence is responsible for all consequences
which arise,and in

respect of mischief which

couid by no pos-

sibikity have been foreseen,and which no reasonable person
would have anticipated.
law to be this,that

I

am inclined to consider the rule of

a person is

expected to anticipate

and

guard against all reasonable consequences,but he is not by
the law of England, expected to anticipate and guard against
that which no reasonable person would have expected to occurf"
Much confusion has arisen on account of the
judges not distinguishing between the conditions and the
cause. Herein again the scientific and the legal

investiga-

tors look at a given statement of facts from very different

20.
standpoints. To illustrate,suppose a carriage is being driven
down hill and a bolt breaks without negligence on the part of
the driver,and the horses are thereby detached from the
riage;as

a consequence

the wagon is

precipitated

car-

over an em-

bakment which the road commissioners had negligently left
without a guard rail,and injury resjts. The scientist might
say that the result was the sum of all

its antecedents,such
of the

as the discovery of ironmaking of a

carriage,breaking

bolt etc. , But in

of the road commission-

law the negligence

ers in not errecting a guard rail is the efficient and proximate

cause.

Palmer v.Andover,2 Cush.600.

of the bolt or making of the carriage

iron,breaking

ply conditions.
the human will

were

sim-

Except so far as conditions are moulded by
16 bringing

about them.

cern itself

The discovery of

about

injury,the law does not

con-

See City of Atchison v.King,9Kan. 550.

Salsbury v.lHerchenroder,106 Mass. 458.
From this brief discussion of the method pursued by the courts in applying the maxim in suits for negligence and breach of contractit

is

clear that it

is

entirely

different from the methods that the courts should use in cases
that fall
cus sed.

in

either of the other two divisions previously dis-

27.

Conclusion.

The conclusion is

necessarily a general

one.The facts of a

case bein- ascertained by testimony,the maxim is applied for
the purpose of ascertaining the rights and liabilities
respective parties to the proceeding.Those facts

of the
alone are

viewed as cause and effect which have a direct bearing upon
those rights and liabilities. The question is sometimes,whether a cause is proximate to an effect,sometimes it is which of
several causes is immediate to an effect; sometimes the question is whether an effect shall be referred to a certain cause
as its

proximate resilt,sometimes

it

is

to which of several

causes the e''ffect shall be referred. There are three divisions into which cases involving one or more of these questions
falls. The method of applying the maxim in each division is of
a different nature from that employed in the others.
It is perhaps unfortunate that this division
has been made, but as has been shown it is a necessary one. If
all the courts would recognize these divisions and use the
line of reasoning applicable to each in applying the maxim,
the law in regard to this subject 1ould become much more settled and uniform than it

is

at present.

A..,

There

is

a

strong tendency to

cite authorities

ately,seemingly not recognizing that

indiscrimin-

cases in which thd

rnaxim

has been applied,are of no value as authorities except

in

that branch of the la,r which governed the reasoning in

that

p--urticular

case.

It

is

apparent

that as long as this

prevails,the

law governing the application

be vaileL in

obacurity,and in

be done.

It

sented that
given.

is

practice

of the maxim

many cases great

injustice

.ill
will

only by observing the various principles pre-

the true legal

*

application of the maxim can be

